give the example of synecdoche? | Yahoo Answers
I had a vague idea of what a synecdoche was, and ignored until then that one February in a hospital in Milan, and delivered a birth certificate with this date on it. . Take the definition that Diego Gambetta gives in his influential lower in predicting whether than the Yahoo weather forecast, I would have. Main · Videos; Speed dating in nyc 18 someone older for dating someone older synecdoche definition yahoo dating synecdoche definition yahoo dating berita. Main · Videos; Ono kao ljubav 21 epizoda online dating dating divas 7 days of love · synecdoche definition yahoo dating · ultimul mohican online dating.
We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.
Another often-quoted example of antanaclasis is the motivational threat attributed to American football coach Vince Lombardi: For example the following are all very simple anthropomorphic expressions, or anthropomorphisms: Anthropomorphism is everywhere, and plays a crucial part in human communications.
There that's another one Interestingly the antonym of the word antonym is synonym a word which means the same as or equates to another. The word is Greek originally meaning 'hidden writings', from apokruptein, 'hide away'.
Apophony is also called ablaut, alternation, gradation, internal inflection, internal modification, replacive morphology, stem alternation, stem modification, stem mutation, among other variants of these.
From apt, meaning appropriate, and Latin aptus meaning fitted. Apparently the term was first suggested by Franklin P Adams. Also called an aptonym or charactonym. Argo may also refer to jargon or terminology that is specific to a particular group or discipline, for example military folk, hobbyists, scientists, etc. The word articulation is ultimately derived from Latin articulus, 'small connecting part'. ASCII is a widely used and prevalent system for coding letters and other characters for use on electronic text equipment, notably computers and the internet.
Originally the 'at' sign was an accounting term meaning 'at the rate of', for example: This peculiar phnomenon, called 'enantionymy' and 'antilogy', attracts a high level of interest among linguists, lovers of language and wordplay trivia. Here are some examples: Further suggestions always welcome.
And separately again, an autonym may be a name by which a social group or race of people refers to itself. From Greek auto, self. The word axiom derives from Greek 'axios', worthy.
Backslang has been at various times popular among teenagers, and exists as a 'reverse' coded secret slang language in many non-English-speaking cultures. Some backslang expressions enter mainstream language and dictionaries, such as the word yob, a disparaging term for a boy.
The full form is commonly a humorous or clever or ironic reference to the word or name spelled by the abbreviation. He paused dramatically, before delivering his final uplifting conclusion, and, re-tasting last night's vindaloo and half-bottle of brandy, was sick on a choirboy There are hundreds of technical variations of pronunciation. This is one example of a group of them. The IPA chart is published here under the following terms of reproduction permission: The 'bullets' the actual dots or marks act like exclamation marks, but at the beginning rather than the end of the sentences.
Professional writers and presenters tend to support the view that there is an optimum number of bullet points when presenting information that is designed to persuade people and be retained, and this ranges between 3 and 7 points, suggesting that 5 points is a good safe optimum. Obviously where bullet points are used in different situations, such as detailed listings and extensive summaries, the notion of an optimum persuasive number no longer applies, and in these circumstances anyway numbered points are usually more beneficial and effective.
It is the opposite of euphony, and like euphony, cacophony is a significantly influential concept in the evolution of language, according to the principle that human beings throughout time have generally preferred to use and hear pleasing vocal sounds, rather than unpleasant ones. Euphonic words and sounds tend to flow more easily from the tongue and mouth than cacophonous utterings, and so this affects the way words and language evolve.Literary Devices - 1A - Trilby & Katelyn - Aporia & Synecdoche
The word is from Greek kakos, bad, and phone, sound. It's from Latin cadere, to fall. The term 'camel' alludes to humpy wordshapes. Another example is "When it had to compete against social networking, TV became less dominant. From Greek kata, down, but based on the same pattern as anaphora. More loosely a clause is interpreted to mean a sentence or statement, especially in formal documents.
This is because cliches by their nature are unoriginal, uninspiring and worse may be boring, tedious and give the impression of lazy thoughtless creative work. There are thousands of cliches, and they appear commonly in day-to-day speech, emailing, texting, etc. Virtually everybody uses many cliches every day. The word is from French clicher, 'to stereotype'.
Examples of cliches are sayings such as: Examples of cockney speech are heard widely in film and TV featuring London stereotypes of 'working class' people, for instance in the BBC soap Eastenders, films about Jack the Ripper, London gangster movies, 'The Sweeny', and other entertainment of similar genre.
Also, the 'th' sound is often replaced by an 'f' or 'v' sound, for example in 'barf' bath'muvva' motherand 'fing' think. The term 'ain't' almost always replaces 'isn't'.
Commonly only the first word of the replacement expression is used, for example, the word 'talk' is replaced by 'rabbit', from 'rabbit and pork', which rhymes with 'talk'. Other examples of cockney rhyming slang may retain the full rhyming expression, for example 'gin' is referred to as 'mother's ruin'. Australian people use rhyming slang too, which is a development of the original cockney rhyming language.
Many words have entered the English language from cockney rhyming slang, lots of which are not widely appreciated to have originated in this way, for example the terms 'scarper' run away, from scapa flow, go'brassic' penniless, from boracic lint, skintand 'bread' money, from bread and honey.
The term 'past tense' may also be called a conjugation, since it refers to an alteration of a verb. This is a very significant aspect of language development. Contraction is a form of abbreviation towards which language naturally shifts all the time. Combined abbreviated word forms such as don't, can't, should've, you're, I'm, and ain't, etc.
Many words are contractions of older longer words, or of more than one word abbreviated by contraction into a shorter word. Language naturally develops in this way. I believe this is true because the office of Vital Records in the Milan Municipal Building registered few days after that date the testimony of my father or my mother that I was indeed born on the 8th of February in a hospital in Milan, and delivered a birth certificate with this date on it.
This fact concerns me, and of course I was present, but I can access it only through this complex, institution-mediated form of indirect testimony.
Our cognitive life is pervaded with partially understood, poorly justified, beliefs. One could view the overall project of classical epistemology - from Plato to the contemporary rationalist perspectives on knowledge - as a normative enterprise aiming at protecting us from credulity and ill-founded opinions. Various criteria, rules and principles on how to conduct our mind have been put forward as a guarantee to preserve the autonomy and freedom of thought necessary to the acquisition of knowledge.
According to Locke, four major sources of false opinions threaten our mind: Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles II.
Predominant passions or inclinations IV.
language grammar literary terms
Yet, the massive trust of others that permeates our cognitive life calls for an epistemic treatment, and has become a central issue in contemporary debates in philosophy of knowledge and social epistemology.
Trustworthiness depends on both competence and benevolence. Here, my aim is to explore some treatments of the more familiar notion of trust in social sciences, moral and political philosophy in order to understand to what extent the notion of epistemic trust may be illuminated by these analyses.
I will contrast evidential vs. Motivational analyses have often been described as non-cognitive. In particular, I will try to ground the cognitive bases of our epistemic trust in our communicative practices. My purpose here is to explore a broader notion of epistemic trust, one that could account of what is common in cases as different as the blind trust of the patient in her doctor, the trust needed in collaborative intellectual work and the everyday trust needed to sustain our ordinary conversations.
Intellectual trust is a central question of contemporary epistemological concerns. Yet, most debate around this notion fails to provide a proper analysis of the notion and only superficially bridge it to the parallel social, political and moral treatments of trust. The result is a lack of explanatory power of this notion in epistemology. Often one has the feeling that talking of trust in epistemology is just a way of evoking the need to varnish our study of knowledge with some moral and social considerations.
On the other hand, sociological and moral theories of trust in authority fail to make the distinction between epistemic vs. There are some obvious parallels between the notion of epistemic trust and that of social and political trust.
Trust in authority poses a similar puzzle in both cases. How is this compatible with freedom and autonomy? And why should we trust an authority to impose us a duty to obey for our own good? Much ink has been spilt on this apparent paradoxical relation between trust in authority and freedom. And of course an equivalent puzzle can be reformulated in the case of intellectual trust: How can it ever be rational to surrender our reason and accept what another person says on the basis that she is saying this?
What does it mean to grant intellectual authority to other people?
SriRangaSri List Archive: Re: [SriRangaSri] UPALAKSANA
In both cases, the appeal to authority calls for an explanation or a normative justification of the legitimacy of the authoritative source, a legitimacy that must be acknowledged by those who submit to it. Still, I think that trust in epistemic authority and in political authority are two distinct phenomena that deserve a separate treatment.
Motivational accounts in the case of knowledge seem desperately unable to avoid the risk of credulity and irrationality that accompanies prima facie any a priori trust in others as a source of knowledge. In what follows, I will briefly sketch evidential vs. Evidential accounts of trust A common view of trust in contemporary social science reduces it to a set of rational expectations about the likely behaviour of others in a future cooperation with us. Take the definition that Diego Gambetta gives in his influential anthology on trust: Thus trust is a cognitive notion, a set of beliefs or expectations about the commitment of the trusted in behaving in a determinate way in a context that is relevant to us.
Following the literature, I call these analyses reductive and evidential. As it has been stressed by contemporary literature on trust in social science, trust must be distinguished from pure reliance. Trust is an interesting notion in social sciences only insofar as it explains the implicit commitment that it imposes on a relationship.
I trust on a certain level of stability of the social world around me.
Give the example of synecdoche?
I trust the person that I cross when walking on the street not to assault me. This is the minimal level of trust that a society should be able to arrange in order to perpetuate.
I need to rely on some regularities of the social world in order to act. But the interest of the notion of trust in social sciences is that it takes into account not only social regularities but also commitments. The key-aspect of evidential accounts that I would like to contrast with motivational accounts is that trust is viewed as a cognitive attitude, as knowledge or belief, for which we can find a rational justification in terms of the capacity we have to read and assess the commitments of others.
What about evidential accounts of intellectual trust? And of course truthfulness is a matter of competence as well as of benevolence. But competence and benevolence are very different things. Competence seems to be a more objective trait than benevolence: Most evidential accounts of intellectual trust explore the dimension of competence more than that of benevolence. The epistemological literature on assessing expertise insists on what are the cognitive strategies that we can adopt in order to assess the reliability of doctors, lawyers, witnesses, journalists, etc.
For example, the weather today is a truth-revealing situation of the expertise of the weather forecast that I have read yesterday on the New York Times. Of course, not every domain of expertise admits truth-revealing situations: In these cases, there exist alternative strategies that allow us to assess the reliability of the overall social process that sustains the epistemic dependence of laymen to experts.
Such strategies have been investigated by various authors, for example Philip Kitcher who names the overall project of describing the strategies of granting expertise to others as The study of the organisation of cognitive labour.
As he points out: Or I can grant you authority due to your better epistemic position: I call my sister in Milan and she tells me that it is raining there and I believe her because I am able to assess her better epistemic position about the weather in Milan. Evidential accounts of trust in authority illuminate the reasons why we reliably appeal to experts in specialized domains. Nor have we always the choice to trust or distrust.
Our commitment to trust is not only cognitive, that is, based on the degree of our beliefs about the future actions of the trusted.
Trust involves also a motivational, non-representational dimension that may depend on our deep moral, emotional or cultural pre-commitments. In a book entitled Authority Richard Sennett defines trust in authority as an emotional commitment. On the same line, Otto Lagerspetz says: That is, the child who trusts her mother, the patient who trusts her doctor, the novice scientist who trusts the truth of the main results in her domain without having gone through the details of the proofs, have different degrees of control and thus of choice on their trustful attitude.
As the anthropologist Maurice Bloch says in his explanation of the role of deference in rituals: We simply do so . The moral philosophical literature on motivational trust tries to establish to what extent such trustful attitudes are morally justified. A more empirical literature in social psychology and economics tries to establish the effects of motivational trust on stabilizing cooperation and reliability in negotiations and in everyday life.
What about the epistemic implications of motivational accounts? Do they illuminate in any sense our trust in epistemic authority? At a first glance, motivational accounts seem better equipped to explain a broader spectrum of cases than evidential accounts do. And if the motivational trust that sustains our social relations may be based on moral, cultural or emotional pre-commitments, what about the pre-commitments underlying the motivational trust that sustains our cognitive relations?
Reidian accounts of epistemic trust Another way to argue for the role of motivational trust in knowledge acquisition is to see it as an innate disposition to accept what other people tell us. And indeed many authors have argued that a natural tendency to trust others is the only way to justify testimonial knowledge. We are justified in believing what other people say because we, as humans have a natural disposition to speak the truth and a natural disposition to accept as true what other people tell us.
But the match between these two principles, that Reid considers self-evident, is far from being clear. The principle of veracity is not well correlated to truth: It just affirms that people are disposed to say what they believe to be true, which does not mean that they say what it is actually true . Reid affirms that if we deny any legitimacy, or at least, naturalness to our trust in others, the result would be skepticism.
It is a fact that we are influenced by others, not only in infancy but in the acquisition of most of our beliefs. But acknowledging this fact is not sufficient explanation of why we are justified to comply with our trustful tendencies. Modern defences of a Reidian epistemology  appeal to the existence of natural language as the material proof that the two principles credulity and veracity indeed tally with each other: Most statements in any public language are testimonial and most statements are true; if they were not it is difficult to imagine how a public language could have ever stabilized.
The very possibility of a common language presupposes a general truthful use of speech. Language, as memory, is a medium of content preservation . I have discussed these positions elsewhere . That is, what concerns us here is: Foley derives it from the justification we have to trust ourselves. We grant a default authority in our intellectual faculties to provide us with reliable information about the world. This is our only way out of skepticism. But if we have this basic trust in our intellectual faculties, why should we withhold it form others?
We acknowledge the influence that others had in shaping our thoughts and opinions in the past. And even in cases of interaction of people from different cultures whose influence upon our thinking is poor or nonexistent, we can rely on the general fact that our cognitive mechanisms are largely similar to extend our self-trust to them [cf.